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The African Standby Force, Genocide,
and International Relations Theory
Stephen Burgess1
US Air War College
In launching the African Standby Force (ASF), African leaders over-promised to
stop genocide, given their lack of political will, the weak capacity of their states,
and the weak military capability of the Force’s subregional brigades. The explanation lies in a combination of South African idealism and determination to exert
continental leadership and the desire of African leaders to sustain or increase
aid to their under-resourced militaries. South Africa does not have the power or
resources necessary to supply sufficient public goods to make the ASF fully functional and capable of fulfilling all tasks. African leaders promised to stop genocide
with the calculation that no one with sanctioning power would challenge them.
Burden shifting by the United States and other major powers was such that
African leaders expected to be rewarded with increased aid flows. A combination
of African nationalism and aid dependence trumped a highly needed international
public good—the political will and military capability to stop genocide.
Key words: African Standby Force, genocide, intervention, idealism, burden
shifting, political will, aid dependence, capacity and capability

In international politics, it is common for the leaders of states and organizations to
make promises and commitments to supply international security and then not deliver on such promises. In contrast, domestic ‘‘political entrepreneurs’’ are usually
punished, particularly in democracies, if they do not at least partially fulfill promises
to deliver national security and other public goods. The anarchical nature of international politics means that there is little incentive to prevent leaders from making
promises to supply international security and other public goods that they know
might not be fulfilled. Furthermore, the leaders of member states belonging to an
international organization are able to ‘‘scapegoat’’ the body; thereby, leaders can
minimize responsibility for over-promising and failing to fulfill those promises.
According to realist theory, the collective action problem and the tendency of weaker
states to ‘‘free ride’’ can only be overcome by a hegemonic power which is willing
to supply the lion’s share of the goods.2 According to institutionalist theory, a
hegemonic power can lead in establishing a ‘‘regime’’ to which member states contribute a share, thus mitigating free ridership.3 In international security, the two
best-known regimes revolve around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and collective defense and the United Nations (UN) and peacekeeping and peacebuilding. However, in a crisis situation, such as the 1994 Rwandan and 2004 Darfur
genocides, regimes and their rules are not sufficient to compel UN or NATO member
states to act and the hegemonic power—the United States—to lead in order to
supply the necessary public goods.
There are various reasons why leaders over-promise or make unattainable
promises to supply international security and other public goods, including a desire
for prestige as well as earnest efforts to solve difficult international problems. Some
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leaders make promises without realizing that there may be a lack of political will
and capability to respond, while others consciously lie.4 Middle powers and smaller
states wish to demonstrate their usefulness in the international order, and poorer
states strive to receive aid. Leaders of organizations such as the UN and African
Union (AU) over-promise because of a desire to prove the legitimacy of their organizations and its worthiness to receive financial support or because of pressures from
member states to respond to supply security.5
The hegemonic power and other strong states tend to cooperate with weak states
and organizations in order to ‘‘burden shift’’ and provide aid and/or side payments,
thereby compounding the problem and adding to the shortfall in international security
caused by over-promising. This tendency is explained by the difficulty and costliness
of supplying security in genocidal situations combined with the lack of interest and
low salience of more powerful states. As an alternative, major powers persuade and
pressure smaller and weaker states and international organizations to assume burdens
that they lack the capability and will to manage. The gap between weak states’ overpromising and powerful states’ burden shifting compounds the collective action problem and causes failures in international security, including the failure to intervene
to stop genocide.
One of the thorniest international security issues is preventing or stopping
genocide. Most states have ratified the 1948 Genocide Convention, which obliges
them to ‘‘prevent and punish genocide.’’ 6 However, states have not acted to prevent
or stop genocide, especially in Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2003–2004), and Bosnia
(1992–1995). A principal limiting factor has been a lack of political will on the part
of state leaders, including the leaders of major powers, to send forces to intervene in
the internal affairs of sovereign states. A secondary factor has been a lack of military
capacity on the part of states in the affected region that might have an interest in
preventing genocide and keeping it from spilling over their borders.
A relevant case of over-promising international security is that of African leaders
who approved the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and signed off on
the promise that the ASF would be prepared by 2010 to intervene to stop genocide.
In 2003, the AU Peace and Security Commission and the African Chiefs of Defense
Staff (ACDS) devised the ASF and outlined six ‘‘typical conflict scenarios’’ in the
ASF’s policy framework. By 2010 the ASF would be able to meet the challenges
presented by six scenarios laid out by the ACDS. The most challenging would be
Scenario 6, the deployment of a robust military presence in 14 days to stop genocide:
1.6 A number of typical conflict scenarios, outlined below were used to develop the
proposals in this document:
f. Scenario 6. AU intervention—e.g. genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.

The document specifies the capabilities that would be required by the ASF to respond
to ‘‘genocide situations’’:
2.8 The speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications for standby force structures and arrangements. Linked to this is the type of
conflict into which they will deploy. Given the fluid and uncertain nature of conflict,
particularly in Africa, coherence on deployment will be critical. This demands that
units and HQ staff will have trained together prior to deployment. Significant implications of varying readiness levels are:
At 14 days readiness collective training involving field exercises with all units is
essential prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for a standing fully staffed brigade HQ and HQ support. There is also a require122
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ment for an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the
entire brigade. Apart from large military alliances such as NATO, individual Member
States may be best placed to provide this capability.

The document stipulates the need for rapid reaction capability to respond in two
weeks’ time:
2.9 Bearing this in mind, the Meeting recommends the following long-term deployment targets for the ASF (all timings are from an AU mandate resolution):
c. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention operations, Scenario 6, it
will be important the AU can deploy a robust military force in 14 days.7

At the July 2004 summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the AU heads of state approved
the proposal for the ASF, including the policy framework and intention to respond to
Scenario 6, with 2010 as the target date for full implementation. However, 2010 has
come and gone, and African countries and the ASF have not come any closer to being
able to meet the challenge of Scenario 6. African leaders have little or no will to
intervene in the sovereign affairs of African states. African states do not have the
capacity and the ASF does not have the military capability to respond to Scenario
6. This is clear if African military capabilities, and especially those of the ASF subregional brigades, are examined in relation to the task of intervening to stop genocide. It appears that, by approving the ASF, AU heads of state and ACDS leaders
were over-promising, though probably not lying. The reasons for over-promising
vary from African heads of state and defense forces that were willing to go along
with the ASF proposal because it increased the likelihood of receiving aid to South
African President Thabo Mbeki, who had a long-term political and security vision
for Africa, and to South African security experts, who helped operationalize Mbeki’s
vision. Mbeki and other South African leaders and officials promoted the goals of
an ‘‘African Renaissance’’ and ‘‘African solutions for African problems,’’ and African
nationalist ideology is the basis for several grand schemes, including the ASF.8
Given the lack of accountability in international politics and the tendency to
over-promise, an additional question is how far are leaders, states, and organizations
willing to push their promises. Is there anything that constrains them from making
wildly unrealistic promises and lying? It would seem that there is a certain point at
which incredulity arises about the promises of weaker states and organizations and
at which stronger powers must step in to provide international security and other
public goods or turn to the United Nations (UN) to do so, which is what happened
after the AU failed to stop genocide in Darfur from 2004 to 2007 and was superseded
by the UN.9

Genocide and What It Takes to Stop It
As defined by the Genocide Convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.10
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The difficulty of proving ‘‘intent to destroy’’ has led to disagreements about whether
or not the mass killings and displacement of people in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur
constituted genocide or the more euphemistic ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’ Subsequently, former
President Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and President Omar el-Bashir of Sudan were
indicted by international courts on charges of genocide.
Only in the case of Kosovo in 1999 was NATO able to stop ethnic cleansing, but
only after 850,000 people had been expelled from their homes by Serbian forces. A
key factor was the political will of President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, and other NATO leaders to prevent the 1992 Bosnian ethnic cleansing that
had dragged on for three years from repeating in Kosovo. However, NATO leaders
were reluctant to risk any casualties and announced that no ground forces would be
used. Fortunately, the United States and other NATO members were able to use air
force to coerce Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing and allow Kosovar Albanians to return
to their homes. The Bosnia case demonstrates that weak political will and undermobilized capability lead to failure, while Kosovo shows that a combination of strong
political will and technologically advanced capacity and capability can stop genocide.
African leaders lack the will, capacity, and capability to do the same.

The Lack of Political Will to Stop Genocide in Africa
There is a large body of evidence to prove that there is a lack of political will on the
part of African state and organization leaders to stop genocide.11 Since the formation
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, African leaders have agreed on
the importance of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member
states.12 When genocide was committed in Burundi in 1972 and 1993 and in Rwanda
in 1994, African states and organizations did nothing to intervene.13 When Tanzania
intervened in Uganda in 1979 to overthrow the murderous Idi Amin regime, widespread protests were raised by OAU member states against the violation of sovereignty. Furthermore, Tanzania only invaded after Amin had ordered his forces to
seize a section of Tanzanian territory.
With the foundation of the AU in 2002, it was hoped that the new organization,
with South African leadership, would be more assertive in providing greater Africawide security and perhaps even be able to prevent or stop genocide. However, the
AU did not respond in 2003 and 2004 to genocide in Darfur as a result of a lack of
political will and a shortfall of African military forces. South African leadership in
the AU did not make a difference. The Sudanese military dictatorship was determined to continue its scorched-earth campaign and resisted all efforts to place an
effective international force in Darfur. Only after hundreds of thousands were killed
and millions displaced as well as considerable international pressure did the Sudanese
government agree to the deployment of an AU peacekeeping force. This force proved
inadequate, and the Sudanese military and militias continued to destroy villages and
murder, rape, and displace people.
The lack of political will to punish genocide has been recently manifested in
many African leaders’ refusal to accept the 2009 indictment of President Omar ElBashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for ordering massive crimes
against humanity, including genocide, in Darfur. A 2009 AU heads of state summit,
in fact, called on the UN Security Council to delay the ICC indictment from coming
into effect.14 Political resistance to genocide prevention has also been evidenced by
the controversy over the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which stipulates
that governments must commit to protect civilians or call on international assistance
if unable to do so. Many African states have resisted signing up for the principle in
124
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the UN because they fear external intervention in their own internal affairs. Efforts
to separate the R2P principle from the type of humanitarian intervention that would
be needed to stop genocide have met with limited success.15

The Lack of Capacity and Capability to Stop Genocide
On paper and in practice, the African Standby Force (ASF) and African militaries
lack the enforcement capabilities needed to intervene, stop genocide, and defeat
spoilers. At present, the ASF mainly consists of a dozen or so infantry battalions.16
The ASF possesses little of the armor, airborne and air power capabilities that an
intervention to stop genocide requires.17 Furthermore, a multinational force will be
unable to achieve the unity of effort to deploy and stop genocide.
More specifically, the full implementation of the ASF subregional commands
entails the development of a number of other capabilities, including airlift, sealift,
and ground transportation to dispatch the rapid deployment units and main ASF
brigades and their equipment to conflict zones and re-supply them. Considerable
logistics and maintenance capabilities are needed to sustain the brigades on a multinational basis. Interoperability, including interoperable communications, is required
for the brigades to achieve unity of effort in the field. Intelligence capabilities are
needed to allow the brigades to operate effectively in their areas of responsibility.18
Full ASF implementation means that the full cost of it must be borne by each of
the subregional commands and their member states, which is still a distant dream.
Effective command and control by subregional organizations and force commanders
over the brigades require combined training exercises as well as sound communication with subregional headquarters and the AU Peace and Security Commission. The
subregional brigades are charged with developing the ability to deploy field level
headquarters that take orders from the AU mission planning cell in Addis Ababa.
All of these capabilities are presently lacking to one degree or another. The ASF
and the subregional brigades did not achieve full implementation by the December
2010 deadline and the ASF is unable to intervene in ‘‘genocide situations where
international community does not act promptly.’’
Some subregional brigades will be more effective in practice than others. The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African
Brigade (ECOBRIG) appear to be well organized, led, and planned, but they have
not proven their effectiveness in the field and do not have the capability to respond
rapidly to stop genocide. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
and the Southern African brigade (SADCBRIG) with South African leadership will
probably be more effective if their commitment level continues to increase. The South
African National Defense Force may still possess the capability of leading a response
to genocide even though it has deteriorated over the last decade. The East African
brigade (EASBRIG) has the advantage of the highly capable and willing Rwandan
military, which is providing leadership in the building of a rapid reaction force and
could lead a response to genocide. The EASBRIG suffers from a lack of command and
control as a result of Ethiopia’s detachment from the countries of the East African
Community.
The countries of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
have relied on France for leadership, organization, and logistics, especially in peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR); thus far, the Central African
brigade does not have the capability to respond to genocide. The North African brigade
is presently organizing under Egyptian, Libyan, and Algerian leadership, but unity
of effort is proving difficult.
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The hardest part—full and effective ASF operationalization with the rapid reaction capability that can stop genocide—remains to be developed. Well into the future,
there will be chronically unstable states, such as Somalia, Sudan (North and South),
Central African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
which will continue to face military challenges from rogue states, insurgents, warlords, and militias that the ASF will not be able to confront and defeat. Even in the
long run, it is not likely that the ASF subregional commands will be a force for rapid
response in ‘‘genocide situations.’’ Africa’s poverty and lack of state capacity are
major impediments that prevent the ASF subregional commands from being fully
developed.
In practice, the operational cases of African peacekeepers in conflict zones, including Darfur and Somalia, have not been encouraging. The African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) was undersubscribed with only a few thousand peacekeepers without
helicopters or other mobility, which meant that the mission was largely ineffectual
for four years.19 In 2008, the UN established a hybrid mission that expanded the
peacekeeping force from 5,000 troops to 19,500 troops and 6,500 police. This hybrid
mission proved more effective, but conflict and human rights abuses continued. The
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMSIOM) has been even weaker. Less than half
of the requested 8,000 troops were deployed and Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi refused
to fulfill pledges to deploy battalions. As a result, AMISOM peacekeepers have been
confined to Mogadishu and have become targets for Al Shabaab Islamist militia
fighters.
Other relevant examples include Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, where ECOWAS forces
proved inadequate to stabilize the situation in the wake of civil war and French
forces had to enforce a cease-fire. In Liberia in 2003, Nigeria and other ECOWAS
states intervened in the wake of a cease-fire but needed the threat of force from the
26th US Marine Expeditionary Unit to ensure stability.20 A month later, ECOWAS
handed over authority to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which
had the capacity to build up the peacekeeping force and sustain it.
The fundamental problem for African militaries and the ASF is a lack of assets,
resources, and sustainability. Future economic growth may provide some African
states with greater resources for possible use in building the ASF and subregional
brigades. However, this will still leave the ASF and its brigades deficient in regard
to the type of resources to fully develop, achieve self-sufficiency, and be successful in
addressing Scenario 6. More specifically, it is difficult for poor countries lacking
trained personnel to develop airlift, logistics, and maintenance. Most small militaries
cannot afford to maintain standby units and keep them in a state of readiness for
extended periods. There is the possibility that donor fatigue will arise and that ASF
structures and functions will atrophy.21
Political will and force projection capabilities are the missing ingredients that
can only be provided by the United States, Britain, France, and a few other countries.22 Their leadership in NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in
1999 established a security regime against genocide and ethnic cleansing in most of
Europe outside of Russia’s sphere of influence.23 In Africa, there are no great powers
that can provide the political will and military capability to counter genocide.

Why African Leaders Promised to Stop Genocide
The motivation to promise to stop genocide came in the wake of criticism of the
OAU and African leaders who did nothing as the Rwandan genocide unfolded over
100 days. In particular, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki came to power in South
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Africa on 10 May 1994 as genocide was occurring and regretted their inability to act.
In response, both Mandela and Mbeki strove to find a way to stop mass killings in
Burundi. In 2000, Mandela assumed control of negotiations to end civil war in
Burundi and develop a power-sharing arrangement, and his successor, President
Thabo Mbeki, committed South African troops to protect Burundian political leaders
and then act as the vanguard of the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi (AMIB).
The South African determination to stop mass killings and genocide influenced its
leadership role in the formation of the ASF and the commitment to stop genocide.24
Mbeki promoted the African Renaissance concept with the vision of ending violence, elitism, corruption, and poverty in Africa and creating the basis for economic
progress.25 Mbeki’s leadership, South African diplomacy, and the cooperation of a
number of prominent African leaders played a major role in the African Renaissance
campaign and the 2002 founding of the African Union. Under the AU Charter, the
AU Peace and Security Council was given greater power to authorize intervention
in conflicts and to monitor human rights situations in member states. On paper,
sovereignty would no longer be as powerful as it had been under the OAU Charter.
In a similar vein, South African leadership spawned the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), to
which African states would submit to review their security and governance situations. The African Renaissance, NEPAD, and APRM were manifestations of African
nationalism as well as South African liberal internationalist repackaging. One of the
aims was to attract more aid and investment from the West. The slogan, ‘‘African
solutions to African problems,’’ became prominent among African leaders at this
time.26
South African idealism, manifested in the African Renaissance concept, was reflected in the establishment of the ASF.27 After the founding of the AU Peace and
Security Council, and Peace and Security Commission, South African leadership
played a major role in influencing the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS) to
adopt the ASF policy framework, including Scenario 6—AU intervention in genocide
situations. In July 2004, African leaders signed off on the ASF policy framework with
little comment on Scenario 6. For them, it was more important to launch the ASF
with the prospect of attracting Western aid. Therefore, over-promising to stop genocide was largely a product of South African ambition and hegemony as well as acquiescence by African leaders to seek an increasing flow of aid for their militaries.28

Why the United States and Other Major Powers Burden Shifted
The United States, as well as Britain, France, and other major powers, allowed the
AU and ACDS’s commitment to use the ASF to intervene to stop genocide to go
unchallenged, which fits into the pattern of powerful states’ burden shifting when
intervention is not in their national interest. Clearly, intervention to stop genocide
in Africa has not been and is not in their national interest.29 Ever since the 1993
killing of 18 US soldiers in a peace enforcement mission in Somalia, the United
States sought to avoid intervention in Africa at all costs and shift the security burden
to African states. After the United States failed to respond to the Rwandan genocide,
the Clinton administration apologized for failing to act but still sought to shift the
burden of responding to genocide to African states. In 1996 the United States proposed an African Crisis Response Force which, developed with US and European
funding and training, would create a standby force that could, among other things,
intervene to stop genocide. After African leaders rejected the concept as too paternalistic, the United States launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (1997–2001)
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to train African peacekeepers and followed it with the Africa Contingency Training
and Assistance (ACOTA) program from 2002 onward. In 2004, the United States
joined European states in the Global Peace Operations Initiative to cooperate in
training 75,000 African peacekeepers. The vast majority of training by the United
States, France, Britain, and other countries prepared peacekeepers to serve only
once a cease-fire had been secured. Very little of the training was suitable to prepare
for intervention in genocide situations, which is what had supposedly motivated the
United States and other countries to initiate the training in the first place.
In 2007, the United States announced the formation of the US Africa Command
(AFRICOM), which became fully operational in October 2008. The mission of AFRICOM
is to partner with African militaries with the aim of making them more effective
operationally. AFRICOM accomplishes its mission primarily through joint exercises
with African militaries. AFRICOM has been particularly interested in working with
the ASF and moving it toward operational effectiveness. AFRICOM has done little or
nothing to prepare to intervene in order to stop genocide.30

Conclusion
Given their lack of political will, the weak capacity of their states, and the weak
military capability of the ASF subregional brigades, African political and military
leaders have over-promised to stop genocide in agreeing to respond to ASF Scenario
6. The explanation for this behavior lies in a combination of South African idealism,
exemplified by the African Renaissance concept, and determination to exert continental leadership and African leaders’ desire to sustain or increase aid to their
under-resourced militaries. South African behavior fits the mold of middle powers,
which try to make an impact on the international system through multilateral initiatives that appear overly idealistic.31 South Africa, as the aspiring hegemon in Africa,
does not have the power or resources to supply sufficient public goods to make the
ASF fully functional and capable of fulfilling all tasks.32
The conduct of African leaders can be explained by their countries’ poverty and
their desire to obtain resources to sustain their militaries.33 African leaders promised
to stop genocide with the calculation that no one with sanctioning power would challenge them. Indeed, as African leaders had anticipated, the United States and other
major powers responded with burden-shifting behavior and rewarded the ASF proposal with increased aid flows. Also, Scenario 6 was just a part of the ASF policy
framework and did not attract the attention of the human rights NGO community
or that of the major powers. Thus, a curious combination of African nationalism and
aid dependence trumped a highly needed international public good—the political will
and military capability to stop genocide. In several regions of the world, weak states
and organizations exhibit similarly contradictory behavior.
In regard to the limits of over-promising, the ASF policy framework did not
contain the promise that African standby brigades would always be able to stop
genocide on their own. Indeed, the ASF policy framework stated that it would intervene in ‘‘genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.’’
However, given the unwillingness of the United States and other major powers to
‘‘act promptly’’ and intervene, the promise was actually grander than it may have
seemed. In regard to over-promising that the ASF would be fully operational and
capable of acting in all six scenarios by the end of 2010, this was done with the aim
of injecting a sense of urgency into the development of the ASF. However, the failure
to come close to meeting the 2010 deadline calls into question the credibility of
African leaders and even concepts such as the ‘‘African Renaissance’’ and ‘‘African
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solutions for African problems.’’ 34 The ASF goals to be fully operational by 2010 and
to stop genocide reflect a tendency to set unattainable goals. This is evident in the
2015 target date for achieving the Millennium Development Goals for Africa, an
aim that will likely not be met. It is also apparent in the unrealistic goals of
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), especially the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM), which promises that African states will make major
changes to their governance in response to peer review and the desire to increase
foreign investment. Challenging timetables may prod African governments to develop their militaries, but they also lead to unrealistic expectations and suboptimal
performance, such as the AU missions in Darfur and Somalia.
The ASF concept will not be fully implemented in the foreseeable future because
African states are too poor and lack the capacity necessary for implementation. In
spite of this reality, African leaders, organizations, and advisers have set up a
scheme that promises to stop genocide and fully deploy but has not been able to do
so by December 2010 and will have difficulty in doing so by December 2020. Nevertheless, African leaders are attempting to demonstrate that African states and organizations are making an organized effort to posture for action and will continue to ask
the major powers to fill shortfalls in financial and military resources. Over-promising
and the failure to fully operationalize the ASF lead one to conclude that the next
genocide in Africa will be met with a failure to act with sufficient strength.
In regard to burden shifting, the ASF promise to intervene to stop genocide and
the slogan of ‘‘African solutions for African problems’’ were welcomed by the United
States and other major powers, which had been struggling to find ways to stop genocide. The ASF complemented the preventive Responsibility to Protect principle and
the transitional justice institution, the ICC. The ASF proposal enabled the United
States and other major powers to invest energies in working with African organizations and militaries without having to develop the doctrine, rapid reaction forces,
and contingency plans to intervene to stop genocide.
Given the importance of stopping genocide, alternatives must be sought for the
ASF concept, which lacks the political will and capability to stop genocide. African
leaders and organizations should openly admit that Africa will not be fully capable
to stop genocide while they call on the major powers to fill the gaps and intervene.
The international community should pressure the African Union and African states
to give an honest account of ASF progress, and lack thereof, and what steps need to
be taken to fill the gaps.
In regard to stopping genocide, the R2P principle and the transitional justice
regime, embodied by the ICC, are providing alternatives, though suboptimal, to the
use of force. The international community, led by human rights NGOs, needs to continue to pressure the major powers and African states and organizations to establish
a compact to stop genocide and other major man-made humanitarian disasters. A
stepping stone to such a compact would be a commitment by African states to the
R2P principle.35 With such a commitment, the ASF and developed country forces
would find it easier to work together to overcome sovereignty claims and intervene
to stop genocide.
Increased commitment and political will by the United States and other major
powers in cooperation with a coalition of the willing, including NGOs such as
ENOUGH,36 could contribute to stopping genocide. The United States and other
major powers could provide rapid reaction and air power capabilities and logistics
in cooperation with African forces to stop genocide. An example was in Liberia
in 2003, when a highly capable force—the 26th US Marine Expeditionary Unit
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(MEU)—combined with a highly salient force—the Nigerian-led ECOWAS Military
Mission to Liberia (ECOMIL)—to stabilize a volatile situation, where a cease-fire
agreement could have collapsed. Nigerian and ECOWAS desire to end the tyrannical
rule of Charles Taylor and US action led to the end of a dangerous stalemate in
2003.37 The Liberian case demonstrates that salience is important; if deployment is
within the subregion, high salience will motivate the ASF brigades to respond more
effectively than if deployed outside of the subregion. If regional military cooperation
develops and flourishes, as perhaps in the case of ECOWAS and the West African
standby brigade (ECOBRIG), subregional capability to deal with some of the more
challenging scenarios requiring enforcement will be enhanced.
A larger question pertains to how African militaries should be organized and led
in peace and stability operations. Given the scarcity of resources and dependence on
donors and likelihood of more internal conflict in weak African states, the ASF and
the subregional commands are not sustainable and will not be for a very considerable period to come. Donor fatigue will eventually pose problems for the ASF. The
ASF represents a diversion of scarce resources and time that Africa and its militaries could invest in alternative methods for enhancing African security. The ASF
may make African militaries more communicative with each other, but it will not
make them dramatically more capable operationally. The lack of logistics, airlift,
and training prevents operational progress. Also, it is easier to maintain national
units rather than a multinational force with elaborate and difficult command as
well as control and planning mechanisms.
Resources being spent on ASF subregional brigades and the AU Peace and Security
Commission could be used to better effect to develop the capability of the armed
forces of individual states to serve in UN peacekeeping missions. A greater number
of highly effective national battalions and brigades could be developed that could be
deployed, supported, and commanded by a UN force commander and staff. Most UN
operations have a proven record of the sustainment and resolution of many African
conflicts, followed by peacebuilding. The UN has resources based on the financial
contributions of developed member states and combine developed countries’ military
resources with developing countries’ troops. A related option would be to train the
battalions of the most effective African militaries, such as Rwanda’s, which would
ensure the deployment of more capable African brigades.38
Ultimately, priority should be placed on effectiveness, with dependence on the
UN and the West, rather than suboptimal security with self-reliance through the
ASF concept. The ASF should remain a long-term goal; it could be fully operational
by 2020 or 2030. Under this more modest proposal, African peacekeepers would continue to be deployed with the authorization of the AU or subregional organizations
before being taken over by the UN. The UN would continue to assume control over
the operations and provide financing, logistics, and other resources.
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